TCSS Security Commentaries #040 

Marvin Hamor Bernardo

The relationship between the Philippines, Japan, and the US is a continuing evolution. Though anchored in historical relations dating farther than the establishment of the US’ pacific alliance network post-WWII, these previous relations have been held bilaterally. The emergence of this new trilateral summit should be viewed in the context of a region undergoing transition. This new trilateral relationship is part of an already large alphabet soup of multilateral and minilateral initiatives. As there is a growing flurry of activity in recent years to construct more, this is indicative of regional players looking for effective formulations or combinations to address a geopolitical situation that is recalibrating.

On April 11, 2024, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. joined a meeting with U.S. President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida in Washington, marking the first-ever Japan-Philippine-U.S. summit (JAPHUS), which unveiled wide ranging initiatives boosting security and economic ties between the three nations and discussed China’s “aggressive behavior” in the South China Sea. 

A large part of the agreements are economic proposals and assistance, as well as partnerships in security and defense, emphasizing collective resilience. However, when closely reading the content and wording of the Joint Vision Statement  a strong thrust at strengthening the Philippines becomes apparent. This is understandable as the Philippines has the weakest economy and military of US’ allies in the pacific and within the first island chain. The other countries being Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are already developed economies with more advanced militaries and domestic arms industry. 

The statement outlines measures to enhance the Philippines resilience against economic coercion. The most important of those is the Luzon Economic Corridor, touted as the first corridor of the G7 partnership  for the Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI) in the Indo-Pacific and part of IPEF. The Measures  come with significant financial contributions from the U.S and Japan, which also seeks to strengthen the cyber infrastructure and integration of the Philippines within the global semiconductor supply chain. Other aspects see the Philippines as being a member of the Mineral Security Partnership Forum as part of advancing clean energy. The statement that emerged from the summit has more to do with both the US and Japan’s concerted effort to assist the Philippines in strengthening its own internal capability, but also enmeshing the Philippines in the global initiatives being spearheaded by the US and Japan. 

Looking at the section on peace and security, the U.S. seeks to boost the Philippines’ defense capabilities. This is supposed to be done through a multitude of ways, one is to increase the capacity of the Philippine Coast Guard through more maritime cooperation and joint patrols in the South China Sea together with Japan. Part of this is building institutional structures for collective response. This also includes advancement of trilateral defense cooperation, through combined naval training, complemented by coordination of U.S. and Japanese support for Philippine military modernization. Another is the inclusion of the Philippines with relationships with other U.S. allies in the region. The statement highlights the development of the trilateral relationship to integrate itself with already existing regional frameworks, such as the QUAD, AUKUS, and the US-Japan-South-Korea (?).

The recent flurry of new institution building in the Indo-Pacific should be considered a recalibration of institutional formations in response to the region’s changing security environment. For decades, China has voiced its dissatisfaction with the existing international institutions, and has called for these institutions to be renegotiated, because China’s concerns were not part of their initial conception. The region has responded, as neighboring states reformulate their security and economic networks in consideration of Chinese interests in the region. 

Among the three Asia-Pacific nations with which the US has a mutual defense treaty, the Philippines has been relatively speaking the most difficult to manage. Not only did the Philippines remove US bases in 1992, wide swings in US-Philippine relations have been subject to individual leaders’ view . Therefore, these recent positive developments are not only a subject of aligning interests, but are also convergence of leadership, especially in the case of the Philippines as the Marcos’ administration abandons the previous pro-China foreign policy of the Duterte administration. This also coincides with a growing public support for a tougher stance in asserting Philippine sovereignty in the South China Sea/West Philippine Sea. 

The Philippines has been restrained in its response to China in the dispute over the South China Sea, even with increasing aggressive tactics from Chinese assets. The Philippines engagement in this trilateral format is a strategic response aimed at bolstering the country’s capacity to respond to external threats through enhanced diplomatic engagement, and deepening already well-established security ties with both the US and the key regional partner Japan. This is to facilitate a strategic choice that strengthens the Philippines position without having to reciprocate aggression. The key role for the US and Japan is assisting the Philippines in developing credible deterrence towards further escalation.                    

                             

Marvin Hamor Bernardo is a second year Ph.D. student in the International Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies (IDAS) at the National Chengchi University, Taiwan.