A balancing act amidst increasing global tensions – how far can Germany walk the tightrope?
TCSS Security Commentaries #040
Maximilian Förstel
German Chancellor Scholz boarded his plane to China on April 13th, but the careful choreography of his high-stakes visit started 4 days earlier: Instead of a diplomatically worded statement, it was a 13 second video on TikTok, marking the opening of the Chancellors official account on the Chinese Social Media platform, which made headlines.
Although this casual approach might suggest otherwise, Scholz’ visit to China came amidst significant challenges facing Sino-German relations. While both the EU and Germany aim to “de-risk” economic relations with China, China remains Germany’s top trading partner. This contradiction was highlighted by Germany’s top cooperate brass joining Scholz on his trip, which vocally oppose new tariffs out of fears of Chinese retaliation. The Chancellor faces pressure from the struggling German economy to address issues such as limited market access for German companies in China and the oversupply of Chinese goods flooding European markets. Politically, Scholz’s Coalition is divided, with the Green-led foreign ministry advocating tougher measures on China than the Chancellor’s Social Democrats or close-to-economy Liberals. Relations between the German Foreign Ministry and China have been strained since last September, when the green Minister of Foreign Affairs Baerbock sparked outrage in Beijing by referring to Xi as a “Dictator”.
Furthermore, the US released a report two days before the trip revealing linkages between the PRC and Russia’s war economy through the sale of dual-use technology, increasing pressure on Scholz to address the issue. Despite these challenges, Scholz embarked on his 3 day-trip to Beijing, marking the longest foreign visit of his chancellorship. While still in the air, the news of Iran’s massive missile and drone attack on Israel reached the Chancellor, adding to his list of pressing issues and leading to the cancellation of all planned tourist activities. Faced with this array of challenges and conflicting interests, Scholz’s trip was pre-determined to be a careful balancing act and juggling exercise.
After visiting Chongqing and Shanghai, Scholz was received in Beijing for talks with Xi and Prime Minister Li Qiang. While some analysts pointed out the cold reception in Chongqing, where Scholz had only been greeted by the deputy mayor of the city, the reception in Beijing involved the full diplomatic choreography of military honours, a private tea ceremony with Xi, official talks and a banquet.
During the meeting, the war in Ukraine took centre stage: Scholz stated that the two leaders had re-emphasized their 2022 consensus in regard to their opposition to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, although the later part was notably absent in the Chinese readout of the Meeting. Furthermore, Xi added that civilian nuclear facilities should not be attacked, an important statement in the light of 3 confirmed drone attacks on the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in the 10 days before the trip. But on the big question of potential Chinese participation in the upcoming Swiss peace summit, Xi kept his cards close to his chest, noting that the PRC would support any such summit if the warring parties agreed to it. As Russia has already announced its abstention from the summit, hopes were previously high that China could participate and act as a link to Moscow. This remains to be seen, especially as Xi also took some thinly veiled shots at the West on the issue, accusing some parties of prioritizing “selfish gains” over peace.
As expected, Xi pushed for economic cooperation, emphasizing the global importance of stable Sino-German relations and stating that “Cooperation between Germany and China is not a risk” in a clear reference to the ongoing derisking debate. An agreement was signed to resume Germany’s export of apples and beef, alongside further agreements on rules regarding recycling and autonomous driving as well as a joint action plan on circular economy. The parties also agreed on holding a high-level dialogue on climate change and green transition. It is worth noting that the discussions lasted a long time, spanning a total of 3 hours and 20 minutes. Of this time, 45 minutes were dedicated to the private tea ceremony shared by Xi and Scholz, surpassing the 10 minutes initially planned.
Conclusion
Scholz had a hard task with this trip. Managing the balance between crucial economic cooperation on the one, and political differences on the other hand, has been the core task of German foreign policy vis-à-vis China for some time. With the Russian invasion of Ukraine and increasing Sino-US competition, this balance has become all the more harder to maintain. In that sense, no spectacular outcomes could have been expected and Scholz brings back some agreements that he can point to for his efforts. On the big question of Ukraine, Xi’s call for the parties to cease attacks on nuclear power plants is a small step, although Scholz ultimately failed to reach any commitment in regard to a Chinese participation in peace efforts. In his final remarks, the chancellor emphasized that the talks served as a small building block towards encouraging China to play a more active role in diplomatic efforts towards a peaceful resolution of the war in Ukraine. Judging from Scholz’s hand gestures, this building block had roughly the size of a dice cube. Symbolic for the whole trip, small steps are both the only realistic hope and the only way to keep the delicate balance of Sino-German relations. As the official motto of the trip “act sustainably together” already suggested, working together is an achievement in itself.
While some outlets had already coined the term “TikTok diplomacy” before the trip, one might also be reminded of a ticking clock: as the war in Ukraine grinds on and the Middle East is on the brink of a wider conflict, time spent without agreeing to substantial measures is costing lives. As Xi rightly pointed out, Sino-German relations hold global significance because of their economic ties. These economic relations could serve as the foundation for creating a link between the emerging global blocs. As a driving force in the EU, one of the US closest allies in Europe and China’s largest trading partner outside the Asia-pacific, Germany has some things going for it when it comes to assuming that role. However, Berlin has so far been reluctant to weigh in on the intensifying Sino-US rivalry. Till the necessary political will materializes in Germany, small steps will be the way to keep the balance – albeit with little else to show for.
Maximilian Förstel is a 3rd year undergraduate student of International Relations at the University of Erfurt and Intern at the Taiwan Centre for Strategic and International studies.
Taiwan Center for Security Studies 