TCSS Security Commentaries #040
Dr. YING-YU LIN
1. Introduction
Right after Taiwan’s presidential and legislative elections in January 2024, China has returned to the routine of using military force and harsh rhetoric against Taiwan. Be it poaching Taiwan’s diplomatic allies or sending military aircraft and balloons to approach the island on a regular basis, China’s actions have no other purpose than to exert pressure on Taipei. Although it is believed that China currently does not have the capability and motivation to launch a full-scale invasion of Taiwan, Beijing might still be hoping to put the island on its political agenda through a demonstration of military prowess by exploiting a diverse mix of military means simultaneously. For the moment, this looks to be the tone that China has set for its military strategy against Taiwan. In the just-concluded annual sessions of the National People’s Congress of China, the top legislative body in China, and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, China’s top political advisory body, representatives from around the country discussed “jointly pushing for the process toward the peaceful reunification of China.” It is the first time since 2018 that the phrase “peaceful reunification” has appeared in China’s official statements. Nevertheless, the so-called “peaceful reunification” still requires the support of military force, a position China does not seem to have changed.
2. Legalization of grey zone actions
Noticeably, in addition to dispatching naval ships to sail into Taiwan’s surrounding waters on a constant basis, China has started this year to incrementally normalize its grey zone actions by launching them alongside legal warfare and public opinion warfare campaigns, attempting to force Taipei and the international community to accept the status quo as defined by it. Instances of the kind include the fatal capsizing of a Chinese fishing boat off Taiwan’s frontline Kinmen Island in February and China’s unilateral announcement of a decision to cancel an “offset” of the north-south M503 flight path agreed to with the island during the Ma Ying-jeou administration. Beijing now takes advantage of international norms to make an issue of incidents or arrangements in areas where both sides of the Taiwan Strait used to have a tacit mutual understanding, trying to lead Taiwan and the international community to accept a new status quo in its favor. The M503 flight route issue relates to regulations of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) while the fishing boat incident off Kinmen involves disputes over law enforcement power in that area. All these issues are what Taiwan has to deal with seriously.
An observation on the two sessions’ treatment of defense subjects: more about internal issues than about external ones
The two sessions, which came to a close on March 11, did not seem to bring any defense issues to the foreground. However, according to information made public during the two sessions, there were still some points worthy of note.
In respect to military expenditure, the steady growth of China’s defense budget in recent years has a lot to do with the modernization of the PLA. Pay raise is an issue that the PLA makes much of these days, which might have something to do with the slowdown in China’s economy. Against the background that China’s economy is struggling to maintain growth, the increase of its defense budget helps keep the pay of service members stable. It becomes an incentive that the PLA can use to recruit sufficient needed personnel in the face of low birth rates that significantly reduce available recruits. This is a direction that could be considered as long as the defense budget is on the rise. In addition to new equipment research and development, increase in training exercises, and maintenance of logistics systems, personnel salary is also an important part of defense budget.
The last noteworthy point is the development of cooperation between the civilian sector and the military, an issue brought up once again at the two sessions. Discussions at the sessions about subjects like coordination of efforts between the military and local governments and how to strengthen new types of combat power and the defense technology industry were all related to the civilian sector. It is obvious to see that the military-civil fusion, a concept much emphasized by China over the past few years, now tends to become oriented toward integrating the military with the civilian sector in the real sense. Talented people and capital in the civilian sector as well as dual-use infrastructure could all be utilized to develop capabilities. And the new types of combat power as identified at the two sessions help establish two goals: the cultivation of future high-tech talents and the development of intelligent warfare. All these trends observed from the two sessions reveal the focus of China’s defense development in the years to come.
3. Conclusion: regional risk variables
In terms of the current cross-strait relations and their future development, whether there will be an armed conflict between the two sides of the strait depends on political decisions by either side. However, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, a question emerges over whether Beijing leadership is still willing to run the risk of invading Taiwan. Who will be the next U.S. President? Are there any black swan or wild card factors? These questions involve factors beyond the control of Taiwan. The best solution is to prepare a wide range of scenarios and imaginary situations in advance so as to be better able to find out potential key variables. It is even possible to understand the decision-making of U.S. presidents via memoirs of former U.S. government officials who had worked with them. By hoping for the best and preparing for the worst, Taiwan can make itself ready to confront challenges in the future.
Dr. Ying-Yu Lin is an assistant professor at Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies, Tamkang University
